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pAbstract
Since 2010 the UK Government has aimed to reduce net-migration. The UK Government
cannot restrict EEA migration, and it has focused instead on restricting non-EEA
migration, including closing routes intended for non-EEA high-skilled workers. We
identify a possible substitution effect in this context: restricting one type of migration
may lead to an increase in an unrestricted type (i.e., ‘balloon effect’). We present
evidence which is consistent with this substitution effect for the case of high-skilled
migrant workers in the UK. We also construct counterfactual estimates of the number
of different types of migrant workers in the UK with pre-policies conditions.
JEL: F22; J24
Keywords: High-skilled workers; Balloon effect; Net migration; United Kingdom;
European Union1 Introduction
Between 1993 and 2013 the foreign-born population in the UK more than doubled
from 3.8 million to around 7.8 million. During that same period, the foreign-born
share of the population increased from 7% to 13% (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2014).
Public opposition to more migration is high, and about three quarters of people in
Britain consistently favor decreasing migrant inflows (Blinder 2014). Unsurprisingly,
migration has become an increasingly important topic for British politicians.
One of the major promises of David Cameron during the 2010 General Election
campaign was to decrease net migration to the UK from the ‘hundreds of thousands’
to the ‘tens of thousands.’ After the election the UK Government established a net
migration (i.e., immigration – emigration) target of fewer than 100,000 migrants per
year by the end of the parliament (i.e., 2015) as a key policy objective, and UK migra-
tion policy has since been focused on this goal.
Everyone entering or leaving the UK for twelve months or more counts towards that
target, including British and other European Economic Area (EEA) nationals whose
entry and exit the UK Government cannot restrict. Given the limitations for restricting
EEA migration, the UK Government’s efforts to reduce net migration are built around
the restriction of inflows of non-EEA nationals and efforts to boost outflows of non-
EEA nationals. These policies are likely to affect the size and composition of the UK
migrant workforce and, in particular, the high-skilled migrant workforce. There is no
route for low skilled labor migration to the UK from outside of the EEA. As such, the2015 Rienzo and Vargas-Silva. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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in order to reduce net migration.
The latest provisional estimate of net migration to the UK for the year to September
2014 is 298,000 (Office for National Statistics 2015). It is now certain that the UK
Government will not achieve the net migration target of 100,000 before the 2015
General Election as promised by Prime Minister David Cameron. Nonetheless, the
recent policies of the UK Government to decrease net migration provide an excellent
opportunity to gain lessons about the consequences of pursuing a migration target in a
context in which discretionary power is limited given the presence of elements over
which the Government has different levels of influence (e.g., EEA vs. non-EEA migrant
workers). In this paper we explore those lessons. In particular, we explore the impact of
the restrictions on different migrant groups in terms of numbers and skills compos-
ition. We place particular emphasis on the possible interaction between the restricted
and unrestricted components of UK migration.
In addition to reducing the number of non-EEA high-skilled workers, restrictions on
non-EEA high-skilled migration could have resulted in an increase in the number of
high-skilled EEA workers in the UK. It is possible that recent UK Government policies
had a ‘balloon effect’ on high-skilled migration, where squeezing it at one end (i.e.,
restricting the number of non-EEA high-skilled workers) led to an increased size at the
other (i.e., inflating the number of EEA high-skilled workers). Employers may look to
the EEA if they are not able to hire as many high-skilled workers as they would like
from outside the EEA. Also, the reduction in the supply of non-EEA workers may cre-
ate a vacuum in the labor market that could be filled by EEA workers. These workers
could target the UK as a destination in response to the non-EEA migration restrictions
or simply come for other reasons (e.g., Eurozone crisis) and have an easier time finding
jobs in the UK.
The key goal of this article is to shed light on the consequences of the net migration
target for high-skilled migration to the UK. The emphasis is on high-skilled migrant
workers as this group is the most likely to be affected by the restrictions. However, we
also explore impacts on the high/low skilled migrant worker ratio. The focus of this
paper is on recent migrant workers (RMW) in the labor force, defined as those who
have been in the UK for less than three years, rather than on the entire population of
migrant workers in the UK. The former are more likely to be affected by the new
migration policies.
This article places particular emphasis on three key questions:
 What was the likely impact of the migration restrictions on overall high-
skilled migration to the UK? The paper compares results for different types of
high-skilled RMW (i.e., based on nationality groups) and with different definitions
of a high-skilled RMW (i.e., based on educational levels and type of occupation).
 Is the evidence consistent with a high skilled ‘balloon effect?’ Evidence
consistent with a ‘balloon effect’ would imply a marked decrease in the number of
non-EEA high-skilled workers and an increase in the number of EEA high-skilled
workers since 2011 when most government policies aimed to reduce net migration
took effect. We present different counterfactual scenarios about the potential
number of different groups of high-skilled RMW in the UK without the restrictions.
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trends and by re-weighting the UK Labour Force Survey so that the post migration
policy changes sample has similar characteristics to the pre-policy changes
sample.
 How has the skilled composition of the UK recent migrant workforce
changed since the establishment of the restrictions? We explore the skills
composition of RMW and compare to those of previous cohorts, investigating if
these changes are driven by the composition of particular migrant groups. We also
provide several counterfactual estimates to examine if the new government policies
may have affected the skills distribution of RMW.
2 Background
2.1 The net migration target and related policies
In 2010 the UK Government established a net migration target of fewer than 100,000
migrants per year. The purpose of the target and related policies was to “scale back net
migration to the levels of the 1990s” (Home Office, 2010). The net migration target
includes all migrants based on (expected) length of residence of 12 months or more in
or out of the UK. Policies related to cutting net migration faced two challenges:
 The UK Government cannot restrict migration of EEA workers: European
Union (EU) law protects the freedom of movement across Member States for
EU workers. The EEA includes the EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein
and Norway and allows the latter three countries to be part of the EU’s single
labor market. Given the limitation in restricting EEA migration, decreasing
non-EEA net migration has been the main focus of the UK Government during
recent years.
 The UK Government cannot simply restrict the routes intended for low
skilled labor migrants in order to achieve the net migration target: The UK
Points Based System was originally envisioned as a five tier category system in
which the Tier 3 category was designed as a route for low-skilled non-EEA nationals
to enter the UK for work purposes. This route was never launched, and there is
currently no route for low-skilled labor migration to the UK from outside of the
EEA. The efforts to reduce non-EEA migration must involve cuts in migration
routes intended for skilled non-EEA nationals.
The bulk of the restrictions on non-EEA migration to the UK came into effect during
2011. The main changes can be summarized into four broad categories (see Appendix for
more details):
 Closing the Tier 1 general category, which was the main route for non-EEA high-
skilled labor migration to the UK without a job offer.
 Putting a cap on the Tier 2 general category, which is the main route for non-EEA
migration to the UK for work reasons with a job offer.
 Adding restrictions to non-EEA student visas.
 Increasing the minimum income threshold for British nationals to bring non-EEA
partners and children to the UK.
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It is challenging to present evidence of a direct link between policy changes and the
inflow/outflow of migrants to/from the UK. Simultaneous changes in many other
factors, such as economic conditions in the UK, are likely to impact the size of
the migrant workforce. However, the impact of UK economic conditions and re-
lated factors are likely to affect all types of migrants (i.e., EEA and non-EEA na-
tionals), while the direct impact of policy changes should be concentrated on the
non-EEA group.
When the new UK Government policies were announced, each policy was accompan-
ied by an impact assessment from the UK Home Office which included an estimation
of the expected level of net migration after the introduction of the policy. The impact
assessments can be used to determine the degree to which each policy was expected to
reduce non-EEA migration. The UK Home Office impact assessments do not differenti-
ate across skill groups, but, as explained above, high-skilled migration should account
for a substantial portion of the reduction in total net migration.
Table 1 reports the expected reduction in net migration as a result of the new
policies. The information on the impact assessments suggests that the total reduc-
tion in net migration was going to be 76,000, distributed as 56,000 from the study
route, 11,000 from the work route and 9,000 from the family route (Home Office
2011a; 2011b; 2012). The final estimate of net migration for 2010 was 256,000.
Hence, everything else constant, the expected level of net migration after the pol-
icies, according to the information on the impact assessments, would be 180,000.
This is an expected reduction of 30% but still falls short of the 100,000 net mi-
gration target.
2.3 Indirect impact of the policies
In practice, not everything remains constant after the imposition of additional migra-
tion restrictions. There is the possibility that policies directed at one group of migrants
indirectly affect another group. As explained above, there could be a ‘balloon effect’ in
which restrictions in one type of migration lead to an increase in another type which
cannot be restricted. Figure 1 summarizes the possible interactions between the restric-
tions on non-EEA migration and EEA migration to the UK.
Restricting the access of non-EEA nationals to UK labor markets could be seen as a
way of encouraging the recruitment of British workers on the part of employers. While
it is likely that some of this recruitment occurs in practice, high-skilled work often
involves a lengthy training period and the supply of high-skilled British workers is
unlikely to increase much in the short-run (i.e., inelastic supply of high skilled labor in
the short-run). The unmet demand for high-skilled workers may lead to moreTable 1 Expected direct impact of the policies on net migration
Estimate Route
Study Work Family Total
Final number for 2010 (A) 256,000
IA expected reduction (B) 56,000 11,000 9,000 76,000
Expected final number (C = A – B) 180,000
Note: IA = Impact Assessment from the UK Home Office. The impact assessments are: Home Office 2011a; 2011b; 2012.
Figure 1 Interaction between restrictions and EEA migrant workers.
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ready to take on the new positions on a short notice. A third possibility would be for
employers to adjust to the shortage of high-skilled workers. For instance, employers
could up-skill current workers or change the production process to make less use of
high skilled labor (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). This response would not increase the de-
mand for high skilled EEA nationals.
In a survey of more than 1,000 UK employers conducted as migration restric-
tions were getting underway in 2011, 18% of employers said that they intended to
respond to the government’s new non-EEA migration restrictions by recruiting
more UK graduates, and 23% indicated that they planned to up-skill existing
workers. Meanwhile, 34% of employers suggested that they intended to recruit
more EEA migrant workers in response to the restrictions (Chartered Institute of
Personnel and Development 2011).
In a follow-up survey in the summer of 2014, 20% of the employers affected by
the migration restrictions said that they actually recruited more EEA workers in
response to the government policies on non-EEA migration (Chartered Institute
of Personnel and Development 2014). There is also evidence from sectors such as
social work that some degree of substitution has actually occurred (Hussein 2014).
Other research has suggested that substitution of non-EEA migrant workers for
EEA migrant workers is not straightforward given differences in experience, for-
mal qualifications, cultural attributes, language skills and tendency to look for
work in particular industries (Bach 2010; Migration Advisory Committee 2012;
Scullion and Pemberton 2010, 2015).
The reduction in the supply of high-skilled non-EEA workers may also make it
easier for EEA nationals to find jobs in the UK. Some EEA nationals may target
the UK as a destination in response to the non-EEA migration restrictions if they
feel that they now have a better chance of finding a job. However, it is likely that
most EEA nationals come to the UK for other reasons, such as escaping from the
negative economic effects of the recent Eurozone crisis and just have an easier
time finding jobs in the UK than it would otherwise be the case without the
restrictions.
The possibilities mentioned above are not mutually exclusive. For instance, some em-
ployers may recruit more UK graduates and EEA nationals. As such, even if there is an
increase in the number of EEA workers in response to a reduction in the number of
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grant workforce) will remain the same. The increase in EEA workers is likely to only
partially compensate for the reductions in non-EEA workers.
3 Data and definitions
The main data source used to construct UK immigration, emigration and net migration
estimates is the International Passenger Survey. Available data on arriving migrants to
the UK from the International Passenger Survey does not include measures of skills.
One alternative is to examine the number of high-skilled RMW using the UK Labour
Force Survey.
The UK Labour Force Survey is conducted by the UK Office for National Statistics,
and it is the largest household survey in the country. It includes over 50,000 individuals
every quarter, and it is designed to be representative of the working age population of
the whole country. The analysis below uses UK Labour Force Survey data for the fourth
quarter of each year (i.e., 2007 to 2013). By comparing each quarter to the same quarter
of previous years, the analysis controls for the potential effect of seasonal changes in
the data.
RMW are defined as individuals born outside the UK who are not UK nationals, have
been in the UK for less than three years, are currently in employment (defined as
employees, self-employed, working for a family business or working under a govern-
ment scheme) and are of working age (16–65 years of age for males, 16–61 years of
age for females).
The analysis presents further distinctions based on nationality in order to test the
validity of the ‘balloon effect’ hypothesis. The focus is on two groups: non-EEA and
Old EU. Non-EEA RMW refers to those who are nationals of countries which are not
members of the EEA. Migrants from these countries need a permit to work in the UK.
We exclude Switzerland, a non-EEA country, from this group given that Swiss nationals
do not need a permit to work in the UK. Old EU RMW refers to those who are na-
tionals of the 14 other countries that were members of the EU before 2004. Nationals
of the Old EU countries have been able to enter and work in the UK without restric-
tions for a long time.
In addition to Old EU nationals, it could be possible to include in the analysis na-
tionals of the countries which have joined the EU since 2004 (i.e., ‘accession countries’
or ‘new EU member states’). A large part of the debate on migration to the UK over
the last decade has centered on the decision to provide unrestricted access to UK
labor markets to nationals of the new EU member states immediately after accession
(Dustmann and Frattini 2014; Lemos and Portes 2013). Migrants from new EU
member states in the UK come mostly for work reasons and have higher employ-
ment rates than Old EU and British nationals (Clark and Drinkwater 2014; Drinkwater
and Robinson 2013). However, our preliminary data analysis suggests that while
many migrants from these accession countries have relatively high-levels of educa-
tion, they tend to work mostly in low skilled occupations and earn low wages. For
instance, while 58% of Old EU and 47% of non-EEA highly educated RMW were
in top occupations for the period of interest, this number is just 7% for those
RMW from the new EU member states. Likewise, Old EU and non-EEA highly
educated RMW earned an estimated £29,000 and £26,000 per year, respectively.
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states. Hence, highly educated migrant workers from new EU countries are not
directly comparable to high-skilled migrants from non-EEA and Old EU countries
and are excluded from the analysis. The mismatch between the educational levels
and occupations for nationals of the accession countries working in the UK has
been well documented in the previous literature (e.g., Campbell 2013; Clark and
Drinkwater 2008; Drinkwater et al. 2009; Vargas-Silva 2014a).
The number of high-skilled RMW in the UK in any given year should have a strong
correlation with high-skilled migration inflows of the previous three years. Migration
policies should not have a major impact on those high-skilled migrants who have been
in the UK for a long period, as many of those originally in need of a permit to work in
the UK would have obtained or be close to obtaining indefinite leave to remain in the
UK (i.e., no longer subject to the UK visa system).
A key methodological issue for this paper is the definition of skills. In the context of
labor markets, relevant skills are difficult to define. In particular, ‘soft’ skills, such as
creativity, communications skills, or empathy, may have an important role to play in
many jobs, and therefore in many hiring decisions, but are difficult to measure and
quantify. In order to have clear measures of who counts as a high-skilled migrant, this
paper defines skills more conventionally. Several indicators in the UK Labour Force
Survey are typically used to assess the skill level of a worker: formal qualifications, the
skill level defined in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) hierarchy and
earnings. This paper employs two of these three indicators: qualifications and SOC
hierarchy. Separate analysis of earnings data was considered, but this information is
only collected in two out of five waves in the UK Labour Force Survey, corresponding
to just about 40% of the respondents of the UK Labour Force Survey who are employees
in any given quarter.
Following the previous literature (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2010; Rienzo 2014; Vargas-
Silva 2014b; Wadsworth 2010), this paper uses the age at which the person left full-
time education as a proxy for level of education. The UK Labour Force Survey provides
multiple educational attainment measures, but these are based on the UK educational
system and may fail to accurately reflect migrants’ qualifications. The analysis defines
highly educated migrants as those who left full-time education at age 21 or later (which
roughly corresponds to at least an undergraduate university degree, but includes
individuals with advanced degrees also).
Many highly educated RMW are not doing high-skilled jobs, since migrant workers
often downgrade upon their arrival to the country resulting in a mismatch between
occupations and educational levels (Aleksynska and Tritah 2013; Currie 2007;
Dustmann et al. 2013). This mismatch may be due to the lack of UK specific hu-
man capital, poor English skills and non-recognition of qualifications (Johnston
et al. 2015). Therefore, we also look at the occupations of migrants. The SOC is a
classification of jobs in terms of their skill level and content. The analysis con-
siders those migrants in the top two categories of the ‘major occupation groups’
as defined in the UK Labour Force Survey (‘Managers, Directors and Senior Officials’
and ‘Professional Occupations’) as working in top occupations. Some of the occupations
that fall under these two categories include: chief executives, hotel managers, financial
managers, scientists, engineers and health professionals. The requirements for an
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National Statistics 2010):
 Managers, Directors and Senior Officials: A significant amount of knowledge
and experience of the production processes and service requirements associated
with the efficient functioning of organizations and businesses.
 Professional Occupations: A degree or equivalent qualification, with some
occupations requiring postgraduate qualifications and/or a formal period of
experience-related training.
4 Methodology
The analysis has two components: estimating actual changes and presenting alternative
scenarios. In the discussion of the actual changes, we report the total number of high-
skilled RMW in the UK and then focus on sub-groups of high-skilled non-EEA and
Old EU nationals.
It is not possible to create a perfect alternative scenario of the number of high-skilled
RMW without the policy changes. However, it is possible to provide a broad idea of the
developments that could have occurred without the policy changes. Two exercises are
conducted for this purpose.
First, we do a simple extrapolation of the number of high-skilled RMW in a pre-
restrictions year. We use the annual growth rate in the number of non-EU and Old EU
high-skilled RMW from 2007 to 2008 and the 2007 number as the base year for the
extrapolation. This extrapolation provides an estimate for high-skilled RMW in 2010 –
2013 if the 2007 trend continued.
We use 2007 as the base in order to address possible concerns of the UK being
in recession from the end of 2008 to mid-2009. It would be expected for the eco-
nomic downturn to affect the demand for migrant labor in the UK. For complete-
ness purposes we also include an estimation using 2009 as the base year (i.e., the
year before David Cameron became Prime Minister and established the net migra-
tion target). The dynamics are similar across base years but we prefer the esti-
mates using 2007 as the base year. RMW are defined as those who have been in
the UK for less than three years and using 2008, 2009 or even 2010 as the base
year would include a substantial portion of the downturn in the period considered
for the definition of RMW.
Second, we conduct a counterfactual exercise in which we ‘re-weight’ the individuals
in the UK Labour Force Survey for years 2010 to 2013 in order for them to have similar
‘average’ characteristics to individuals in the 2007 sample. These characteristics include
the workforce share of high-skilled RMW and the relative importance of different sec-
tors of the economy for overall UK employment. This approach has been used exten-
sively in other settings (e.g., Lemieux 2006, Rienzo 2014). Intuitively, this approach
answers questions such as the following: How many high-skilled non-EEA RMW would
there be in the UK in 2013 if the characteristics of the workforce where the same as in
2007—i.e., when restrictions were not implemented? The re-weighting exercise down-
weights some individuals and upweights others so that their observable characteristics
(age, gender, nationality, education, marital status, occupation) closely resemble those
of the 2007 population.
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turn and the introduction of the policies to decrease net migration. The comparison is
to the characteristics of the workforce in a pre-downturn, pre-restrictive policies
period. Note that by 2012 and 2013 all RMW are post-downturn migrants, while for
2007 all RMW are pre-downturn migrants. For completeness purposes we also report
the estimates obtained using 2009 as the comparison year.
In technical terms, let ωit be the UK Labour Force Survey sample weight for
worker i at time t (t = 2010, 2011, 2012 or 2013) and ωit be the counterfactual
weight for worker i that makes the composition of the population the same as in
a base year s (i.e., 2007). The weight ωit is calculated by the UK Office for National
Statistics, and it is included in the UK Labour Force Survey datasets, but it is ne-
cessary to estimate ωit . We calculate ω

it in two steps. First, we estimate a logit
model with pooled data from year t and 2007, having as the dependent variable a
dummy for the year t, and as controls the characteristics of the workforce, includ-
ing a dummy variable indicating ‘recent high-skilled migrant worker’ status, as
well as a quadratic in age, interaction terms between age and education, marital
status, gender, nationality group and major occupation based on SOC2010 defin-
ition. Second, we obtain the predicted probability (Pi) that an individual with cer-
tain characteristics is observed in year t rather than in the base year 2007. Then






Finally, we estimate the population values using the new weights in (1).
In order to illustrate the usefulness of the re-weighting procedure, we provide the ex-
ample in Table 2. These are two actual individuals in the sample. Individual A is
33 years old and has 11 years of schooling in 2013. Individual B is 55 years old and has
17 years of schooling in 2013. On average, the individuals in the 2013 population are
older and have more years of schooling than those in the 2007 population. This should
be reflected in their relative probabilities of being observed in 2013 relative to 2007.







As reported in Table 2, this is actually the case. Therefore, in the re-weighting pro-
cedure, the weight of Individual A increases considerably, but the weight of individual
B does not change much.Table 2 Example using the re-weighting procedure
Variable Individual A Individual B
Age 33 55
Years of schooling 11 17
UK Labour Force Survey weight (ω) 688 368
Pi/(1 – Pi) 1.32 1.06
New weight (ω*) 906 391
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served in 2013 than in 2007 given their overall characteristics, suggesting a lower
(higher) value of Pi and a higher (lower) value of (1 – Pi). These individuals are thus up
weighted (down weighted) when ωit is replaced by ωit . This re-weighting approach
is equivalent to propensity score matching. In this case the period t sample is the ‘treat-
ment group’, while the 2007 sample is the ‘control group’. The estimated propensity
score is Pi. See DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), DiNardo (2002) and Lemieux
(2006) for further discussion of the methodology.
In the same spirit of the propensity score matching, the re-weighting approach does
not rely on functional form assumptions. However, the reweighting approach is based
on other key assumptions. The methodology is based on the assumption that assign-
ment to the treatment (i.e., the probability to be observed in a specific year) only
depends on observable characteristics. That is, the methodology assumes no selection
on unobservables. Unlike propensity score matching, there are not specific tests
developed for this methodology regarding this assumption. In our analysis, the distribu-
tion of unobservable skills/characteristics of individuals within the same level of educa-
tion and nativity status is assumed to be stable over time. This implies that any
self-selection of migrants into the UK is assumed to be time-invariant over the
period examined and it is not affected by the recent UK Government policies.
5 Actual changes
5.1 Number of high-skilled RMW
While evaluating the evidence presented below, it is important to keep in mind that
the focus of this paper is on high-skilled ‘recently arrived migrant workers,’ or RMW,
rather than the whole population of high-skilled migrants working or living in the UK.
Evidence of a reduction in the number of RMW does not indicate a reduction in the
total number of high-skilled migrants working in the UK but just a reduction in the
number who arrived recently (i.e., a measure which reflects the recent inflow of
migrants).
Panel A of Table 3 reports the total number of high-skilled RMW in the UK in
each year from 2010 to 2013, and under slightly different definitions of who
counts in this high-skilled group. Column (1) reports numbers for highly educated
workers, without distinctions by type of employment. The overall number of
highly educated RMW increased from 188,000 in 2010 to 270,000 in 2011, the
peak for the period in the table. As explained above, 2011 was the year in which
most of the new restrictions to decrease net migration came into effect. The num-
ber of high-skilled RMW in 2013 was 242,000, a reduction of 28,000 from 2011
(10% decrease). As expected, the new policies to decrease net migration have re-
sulted in a smaller number of high-skilled RMW in the UK. However, the reduc-
tion is not very large. Looking at those in top occupations and those in top
occupations that are also highly educated provides a similar picture: there are less
high-skilled RMW in the UK, but the reduction is not big.
The previous discussion suggests that there was a relatively small reduction in the
number of high-skilled RMW since 2011. This would suggest that while the UK
Government policies may have had some effect on high-skilled migration, the impact
was not substantial. But it is important to remember that these policy changes were
Table 3 High-skilled RMW in the UK (thousands)
Year Highly educated Top occupations Highly educated and top occupations
(1) (2) (3)
(A) All RMW
2010 188 79 62
2011 270 103 89
2012 227 94 83
2013 242 97 82
(B) Non-EEA RMW
2010 109 49 42
2011 154 65 56
2012 119 60 53
2013 94 44 38
(C) Old EU RMW
2010 33 15 10
2011 51 30 28
2012 50 24 21
2013 78 45 39
Note: Column (1): highly educated in all types of employment. Column (2): those in the top two main occupation
categories, all levels of education. Column (3): highly educated and in the top two major occupation categories.
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UK Government cannot impose limitations on their migration.
Panel B of Table 3 presents a similar analysis to Panel A but with a focus only on
those RMW from outside the EEA. The overall number of highly educated non-EEA
RMW has decreased by close to 39% since 2011 (from 154,000 in 2007 to 94,000 in
2013). There has been a negative trend in this number since 2011, when policies to
reduce net migration to the UK presumably began to have the bulk of their effects. The
results are similar for all columns of Table 3.
Panel C of Table 3 repeats the same analysis but for Old EU nationals. The number
of high-skilled Old EU RMW increased from 51,000 to 78,000 in 2013, a 53% increase.
This increase is consistent across all columns.
The increase in Old EU RMW does not come as a surprise. Recent data from
national insurance number registrations in the UK show that nationals of Spain and
Italy occupied the second and third place in registrations among adult overseas
nationals entering the UK in the year to March 2013. Only nationals of Poland, the
main country of immigration to the UK since 2004, came ahead of the Spanish and
Italian nationals. National insurance number registrations to nationals of Spain and
Italy increased by 50% and 35%, respectively, compared to the previous year (Department
of Work and Pensions 2013). Information from the UK International Passenger Survey also
suggests a recent surge in Old EU migration to the UK. An estimated 104,000 Old
EU nationals arrived to work in the UK in 2013, an increase of 19,000 compared to
2012 (Office for National Statistics 2015).
It is also possible that the dynamics presented above are somehow affected by
changes in sub-groups of high-skilled RMW. In order to explore this, Table 4 presents
the results if we focus on certain sub-groups of highly educated RMW. Column (1)
Table 4 Sub-groups of highly educated RMW in the UK (thousands)
Year Full time Employees Excluding students
(1) (2) (3)
(A) All RMW
2010 138 177 147
2011 208 251 218
2012 183 202 202
2013 197 226 221
(B) Non-EEA RMW
2010 76 106 82
2011 109 148 117
2012 91 110 104
2013 75 93 84
(C) Old EU RMW
2010 27 30 26
2011 45 46 46
2012 43 47 46
2013 65 75 72
Note: Column (1) only includes those who are in full time employment. Column (2) only includes those who are
employees. Column (3) excludes those who are currently studying. Source: authors’ estimates from the UK Labour Force
Survey, Q4.
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fected part-time and full-time workers differently. Column (2) only includes indi-
viduals who are employees (i.e., excludes those in self-employment). Column (3)
excludes those who are currently studying. As explained above, non-EEA students
were one of the main targets of the new Government restrictions. Limiting the
analysis to the sub-groups does not affect the main result. In all three columns
there is a substantial decrease in non-EEA RMW since 2011 and an increase in
Old EU RMW.
6 Alternative scenarios
In this section we construct several scenarios of the potential dynamics of high-skilled
migration to the UK without the new government policy restrictions.
6.1 Previous trends
As explained above we start by using the annual growth rate in non-EU and Old EU
RMW in the UK for 2007 and project the number of high-skilled RMW assuming
those same growth rates for the years after 2007. We also present results using 2009 as
the base year. The growth rate of non-EEA highly educated RMW for 2007–2008 was
16%. The growth rate of Old EU highly educated RMW for 2007–2008 was −3%. As
shown in Figure 2, if those growth rates were to hold for the following years, we would
have seen a much greater increase in the number of high-skilled non-EEA RMW and a
modest decrease in the number of Old EU RMW. By 2013 the number of non-EEA
highly educated RMW would have been 368,000, almost four times higher than the
actual number, and the number of highly educated Old EU RMW would have been
about 28,000 less than the actual value.
Figure 2 Actual and projected Non-EEA and Old EU high-skilled RMW using trend. (A) Highly educated
RMW. (B) RMW in top occupations. Source: Authors’ analysis of the UK Labour Force Survey, Q4. Shaded
areas indicate the periods in which most policies to decrease net migration were in effect.
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while the growth rate of Old EU RMW in top occupations for 2007–2008 was −10%.
The results suggest that the number of non-EEA RMW in top occupations would
have been 38,000 higher if this pattern had continued over the next few years,
and the number of Old EU nationals in top occupations would have been 28,000
lower. The main dynamics are similar if we use 2009 instead of 2007 as the base
year.
6.2 Re-weighting procedure
Table 5 reports the average characteristics of the UK working age population during
the 2007–2013 period. In the re-weighting exercise, the working age population of each
year from 2010 to 2013 is matched separately with that of 2007. There were about 35
million people of working age in the UK during 2013. Hence, every percentage point in
the table roughly accounts to about 350,000 individuals. One interesting trend
Table 5 Characteristics of the UK working age population
2007 2010 2011 2012 2013
Demographic variables
Married 56.36% 54.47% 53.84% 53.66% 52.76%
Age (years) 37.82 37.73 37.71 37.75 37.77
Education (years) 13.66 13.69 13.77 13.83 13.90
Female 52.54% 52.62% 52.61% 52.54% 52.55%
RMW status
Non-EEA RMW 0.76% 0.49% 0.63% 0.46% 0.38%
Old EU RMW 0.25% 0.16% 0.20% 0.19% 0.32%
Non-EEA highly educated RMW 0.43% 0.30% 0.43% 0.33% 0.26%
Old EU highly educated RMW 0.18% 0.09% 0.15% 0.14% 0.22%
Major occupation group
Managers and Senior Officials 11.31% 11.14% 7.01% 7.22% 7.31%
Professional occupations 9.91% 10.37% 14.05% 14.48% 14.88%
Associate Professional and Technical 11.05% 10.78% 10.12% 10.43% 10.33%
Administrative and Secretarial 8.38% 7.59% 7.84% 7.61% 7.56%
Skilled Trades Occupations 8.43% 7.65% 8.05% 7.81% 7.95%
Personal Service Occupations 5.82% 6.22% 6.37% 6.46% 6.67%
Sales and Customer Service Occupations 5.77% 5.50% 6.00% 6.10% 6.00%
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 5.38% 4.72% 4.58% 4.62% 4.59%
Elementary Occupations 8.74% 8.25% 8.09% 8.09% 8.08%
Not in employment 25.21% 27.80% 27.91% 27.18% 26.64%
Source: authors’ estimates from the UK Labour Force Survey, Q4.
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portant over time, while ‘Managerial and Senior Officials’ occupations have become less
important.
As explained above the first step in the construction of the counterfactuals is to
estimate separate logit models with pooled data from year 2007 and each of the fol-
lowing years. An additional file 1, which accompanies this paper, contains the re-
sults (i.e., odd ratios and logit coefficients) from each of these estimations. Using
the information from the logit models, it is possible to create the counterfactuals.
Figure 3 shows the results of the re-weighting procedure. As with the extrapolation,
it is possible to observe that if the characteristics of the UK workforce (including
the likelihood of being a high-skilled RMW) were held at their 2007 means, the
number of non-EEA highly educated RMW would have been much higher in 2013
(102,000 higher), and the number of Old EU high-skilled RMW would have been
about the same. Looking at those in top occupations, this number would have been
25,000 higher for non-EEA RMW and 14,000 lower for Old EU RMW. Moreover,
changing the comparison year to 2009 does not affect the main dynamics.
7 High-skilled RMW as a share of all RMW
It is also possible to examine if the restrictions have resulted in RMW being more
likely to be high skilled. As suggested by Table 6, despite the reduction in abso-
lute numbers of highly educated RMW during the 2007–2103 period, the RMW
Figure 3 Actual and re-weighted Non-EEA and Old EU high-skilled RMW. (A) Highly educated RMW.
(B) RMW in top occupations. Source: Authors’ analysis of the UK Labour Force Survey, Q4. Shaded areas
indicate the periods in which most policies to decrease net migration were in effect.
Table 6 Share of RMW which is highly educated
Year Highly educated Top occupations Full time Employees Excluding students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(A) All RMW
2007 50% 76% 48% 50% 47%
2013 60% 85% 60% 62% 59%
(B) Non-EEA RMW
2007 58% 75% 56% 58% 55%
2013 68% 87% 67% 70% 66%
(C) Old EU RMW
2007 70% 75% 70% 70% 69%
2013 69% 87% 73% 68% 70%
Note: Column (1): highly educated in all types of employment. Column (2): highly educated and in the top two major
occupation categories. Column (3): same as Column (1) but only includes those who are in full time employment.
Column (4): same as Column (1) but only includes those who are employees. Column (5): same Column (1) but
excludes those who are currently studying. Source: authors’ estimates from the UK Labour Force Survey, Q4.
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who are highly educated has increased from 50% in 2007 to 60% in 2013. This
suggests that the reduction in ‘non-high skilled’ migration has been greater than
the reduction in high-skilled migration. This increase was driven by a rise in the
proportion of non-EEA RMW which is highly educated from 58% to 68%. The
proportion of Old EU RMW which is highly educated has remained stable over
time at about 70%.
Figure 4 provides counterfactual estimates of the share of all RMW which would
have been highly educated if the UK workforce of 2013 had the same characteris-
tics of that of 2007. In all cases RMW would have been less likely to be highly
educated. The difference between the actual and counterfactual estimate for non-
EEA nationals is 8 percentage points, while the difference is 3 percentage points
for Old EU nationals.
8 Conclusion and policy implications
The main goal of the UK Government’s migration policy since 2010 has been to
decrease net migration to less than 100,000 migrants per year by the 2015
General Election. According to the latest net migration estimate, this goal will not
be achieved. This paper contributes to the existing literature by exploring the re-
cent policies of the UK Government to analyze the consequences of pursuing a
migration target in a context in which discretionary power is limited. The results
suggest that policies to decrease net migration were accompanied by a reduction
in non-EEA high-skilled RMW and an increase in EEA high-skilled RMW. This is
consistent with the fact that UK Government policy changes to make migration
more restrictive have been directed towards non-EEA nationals and include the
restriction and closing of routes intended for high-skilled migrants. Counterfactual
estimates suggest that there would have been more non-EEA high-skilled RMW
and fewer Old EU high-skilled RMW in the UK in 2013 with pre-policies
conditions.
This finding has important implications for migration policymaking within an area of
free movement of labor, such as the EEA. In this case migration involves elements over





























Figure 4 Share of all RMW which is highly educated in 2013. Source: Authors’ analysis of the UK Labour
Force Survey, Q4.
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government cannot control the immigration and emigration of EEA nationals. As such,
efforts directed at reducing the migration from those groups that the government
can control may lead to increases in those groups that the government cannot control
(i.e., ‘balloon effect’). This paper does not prove beyond any doubt that the effect is the
consequence of the recent UK Government policies, but it shows that this is a possibil-
ity that is consistent with the data and worthy of further investigation and consider-
ation by policymakers.
9 Appendix: Details of main migration policy changes
Closing Tier 1 general: The Tier 1 general category was the main route for non-EEA
high-skilled labor migration to the UK without a job offer under the UK Points
Based System. It opened in 2008 as a replacement for the Highly Skilled Program.
Close to 14,000 visas were issued under the Tier 1 category in 2010 (Blinder
2013). This category was closed in 2011. Now most non-EEA nationals migrating
to the UK for work need a job offer. One of the justifications for closing the Tier 1 gen-
eral category was that while those coming by this route were highly educated, a share of
those in this unrestricted category was doing unskilled work (29% according to UK
Border Agency (2010)). We address this possible mismatch between education and oc-
cupations in our analysis by using alternative definitions of a high-skilled migrant
worker.
Cap on Tier 2 general: The Tier 2 general category is the main route for non-EEA
migration to the UK for work reasons with a job offer. In 2011 the UK Government
introduced a cap of 20,700 to the number of non-EEA nationals who can apply
under this category. Intra-company transfers are not included under the cap. Since
the introduction of this cap, the number of visas issued under this category has
been substantially lower than the limit, suggesting than the cap is ‘non-binding.’
This category was also limited to those in ‘graduate’ level occupations based on
the Standard Occupational Classification (see explanation in Section 3), a limita-
tion which could have a greater effect on numbers. The migrant does not neces-
sarily need to hold a graduate qualification, but the job (i.e., vacancy) must be in
the graduate occupation list.
Restrictions on student migration: Since 2011 the UK Government has added mul-
tiple checks for international students’ compliance with visa rules, establishing restric-
tions on permission to work for international students and limiting the entitlement to
bring dependents with them. The government also closed the Tier 1 Post-Study Work
route, which allowed non-EEA university students to remain in the UK and work
for two years after graduation. There were no earnings or employment conditions
requirements.
Restrictions on family migration: Since 2012 the UK Government has made it more
difficult for UK nationals and settled migrants to bring a non-EEA spouse or children
from abroad. This includes increasing the minimum income threshold to bring non-
EEA partners and children to the UK and additional restrictions such as the need to
demonstrate English proficiency. Recent estimates suggest that about half of British na-
tionals are now unable to sponsor a non-EEA spouse into the UK (Markaki and
Vargas-Silva, 2014).
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